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1 The Problem
Researchers in all empirical fields are increasingly expected to widely share the data behind their
published research, to enable other researchers to verify, replicate, and extend their work. Indeed,
data-sharing is now often mandated by funding agencies [61, 57, 58] and journals [51, 31, 76]. To
meet this need, a variety of open data repositories have been developed to make data-sharing easier
and more permanent. The index from the Registry of Research Data Repositories surpassed 1500
different repositories in April 2016 [5].
The largest general-purpose repositories include those that use the open-source Dataverse plat-
form [17, 42] (including Harvard’s Dataverse repository, which has, under some measures, the largest
repository of social science datasets in the world), CERN’s Zenodo, and the commercial Figshare
[70], and Dryad [78] repositories.
However, many of the datasets in the social and health sciences contain sensitive personal in-
formation about human subjects, and it is increasingly recognized that traditional approaches such
as stripping “personally identifying information” are ineffective at protecting privacy, especially if
done by a lay researcher with no expertise in deidentification. This leads to two problems, one for
privacy and one for utility:
1. There are numerous data sets, such as surveys, that have been “deidentified” via traditional means
and increasingly are being deposited in publicly accessible data repositories. As the literature has
repeatedly shown, it is likely that many subjects in these surveys can be reidentified by attackers
with a moderate amount of background information, and thus their privacy may not be sufficiently
well-protected.
2. There are numerous other data sets that are not available at all, or only with highly restrictive and
time-consuming provisions. Such provisions can include a review by the original data depositor—
who may no longer be accessible—and/or an Institutional Review Board (IRB), and a lengthy
negotiation between institutions on the terms of use.
Thus, an important problem is to develop and deploy methods that can be used to offer greater
privacy protections for datasets of the first type, ideally at little or no cost in utility1, and enable
the safe sharing of datasets of the second type.
Differential privacy [25] offers an attractive approach to addressing this problem. Indeed, it
provides a formal mathematical framework for measuring and enforcing the privacy guarantees
provided by statistical computations.
The level of privacy protection that differential privacy can offer is described in terms of two
privacy loss parameters  and δ; the smaller they are, the greater the level of privacy. To achieve this
greater level of privacy protection, a differentially private algorithm will generally inject a greater
amount of random “noise” into a statistical computation, thereby yielding less “accurate” results.
Using differential privacy enables us to provide wide access to statistical information about
a dataset without worries of individual-level information being leaked inadvertently or due to an
adversarial attack.
There is now both a rich theoretical literature on differential privacy and numerous efforts to
bring differential privacy closer to practice, including large-scale deployments by Google [29], Apple
[33], and the U.S. Census Bureau [46] (See Section 5 for more on previous work.) However, none of
the past work simultaneously meets all of our desiderata for such a system:
1Even traditional de-identification techniques have been found to have a significant negative impact on utility [19].
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• Accessibility by non-experts: researchers in the social sciences should be able to use the system
to share and explore data with no involvement from experts in data privacy, computer science, or
statistics.
• Generality: the system should be applicable and effective on a wide variety of heterogeneous
datasets, as opposed to being tailored for a particular data source or domain.
• Workflow-compatibility: the system should fit naturally in the workflow of its users (e.g. re-
searchers in the social sciences), and be positioned to offer clear benefits (e.g. more access to
sensitive data or less risk of an embarrassing privacy violation) rather than being an impediment.
2 Our Contribution: PSI
In this paper, we provide an overview of PSI (“a Private data Sharing Interface”), a system we
have developed to enable researchers in the social sciences and other fields to share and explore
privacy-sensitive datasets with the strong privacy protections of differential privacy. It is designed
to achieve all of the desiderata mentioned in Section 1 (Accessibility for Non-Experts, Generality,
and Workflow-compatibility). Unique features of PSI include:
• None of its users, including the data depositors who have privacy-sensitive data sets they wish to
share and the data analysts who seek to analyze those datasets, are expected to have expertise in
privacy, computer science, or statistics. Nevertheless, PSI enables them to make informed decisions
about the appropriate use of differential privacy, the setting of privacy loss parameters, the parti-
tioning of a privacy budget across different statistics, and the interpretation of errors introduced for
privacy.
• It is designed to be integrated with existing and widely used data repository infrastructures, such
as the Dataverse project [17, 42], as part of a broader collection of mechanisms for the handling
of privacy-sensitive data, including an approval process for accessing raw data (e.g. through IRB
review), access control, and secure storage. Consequently, PSI can initially be used to increase the
accessibility of privacy-sensitive data, augmenting rather than replacing current means for accessing
such data, thereby lowering the adoption barrier for differential privacy.
• Its initial set of differentially private algorithms were chosen to include statistics that have wide
use in the social sciences, and are integrated with existing statistical software designed for lay
social science researchers, namely the Zelig [15] package in R and the TwoRavens [37] graphical data
exploration interface.
We have developed a prototype of the system. Integration with Dataverse is ongoing and will
be live in the near future. The features of PSI described in this paper are at differing stages
of completion. Some have been implemented and thoroughly evaluated in both user tests and
replication experiments (see Sections 14 and 15 , respectively), some have been implemented but
have not undergone user testing either intentionally to reduce participant fatigue or because they
were still in progress at the time of testing, and others are actively in development. Throughout the
text we indicate which aspects of the system are implemented and which are in development, and
the sections on user testing and replication experiments describe which pieces of the tool underwent
those evaluations.
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A preliminary prototype of PSI is available at http://privacytools.seas.harvard.edu/psi.
It does not yet incorporate all of the planned features described in this paper, as a number of them
are still under development. The purpose of this paper is to describe the design of PSI, and initiate
a discussion about the choices made and possible alternatives.
3 A Motivating Story
Consider a social scientist, Alice, who is studying the relationship of health status to political
participation. Since the rules surrounding health insurance have been a recent focus of political
debate, the researcher is interested to see if individuals with health problems have become more
engaged in the political process. She searches the catalog of the tens of thousands of datasets
archived in a Dataverse data repository and locates several that may contain information to test
her hypothesis. Some are broad surveys of attitudes and behavior that contain hundreds of questions
across many domains,2 so likely contain only a couple of questions on voting turnout or a couple
of questions on health status. Some are more focused studies that survey patient populations, with
richer questions about their medical issues and questions to judge the impacts on their lives and
opinions, or longitudinal studies that revisit these participants repeatedly over a long time scale.
She might also locate detailed time diary studies, where respondents agree to provide extensive
recordings of how they spend their time each day, spaced with periodic surveys, that might even
include biological surveys of cortisol and other hormone levels from saliva.
The broad surveys are generally available for public download from the repository; however, even
here, geographic variables such the state of residence, are only available in a special version that
is closed to the public.3 The focused studies may or may not be publicly available for download
depending on the original data depositor’s wishes, agreements with the depositor’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB), and whether the data touches on vulnerable protected populations (such
as children, felons, minorities, the disabled) or data for which there are federal regulations (such
as health care and student records). The time diary studies, because of their rich description of
individuals and potential for reidentification, will almost certainly be stored but unavailable to the
researcher.
In summary, as the datasets become richer, and more likely to directly test her hypotheses, they
are more likely to be unavailable for download. So our researcher can use the data easily available
and test the broadest implications of her theory with somewhat crude proxy variables for the items
of interest. Or she can apply to gain access to sensitive data that can allow her to directly test
all of her hypotheses in nuance. Each application delays the research project, is costly in terms of
researcher time and IRB resources, and commonly requires participation or approval by the original
data depositor and relevant IRBs, all of which in turn may need to be facilitated by communication
through the repository staff curators. Even if a researcher is committed to applying for access
to private data, the available descriptions of the data are often insufficient to judge which of the
potential closed datasets contain the best or most relevant data for the researcher’s purposes. Many
of these IRB applications may turn out to be costly lost efforts once access is finally granted. For
2For example the General Social Survey, National Election Study, or Cooperative Congressional Election Study.
3For example, to get the state of residence of respondents, the General Social Survey requires a signed contract
with the researcher, a thorough description of the research to be conducted on the data, a fee of $750, approval from
the researcher’s IRB, and construction of a data protection plan that generally requires non-networked computers set
up in a room with secured limited access [8].
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Figure 1: Overview of a data analysis repository using PSI.
example, there may be an insufficient number of data points of the type required, or the variables
are not measured in the manner expected, or the time period is wrong.
Imagine instead that the repository enabled Alice to run exploratory statistical procedures on
the datasets in Dataverse, so as to learn which datasets would be useful to her research, but only
returning statistical answers that are differentially private, so as to uphold the repository’s ethical
and legal responsibilities to safeguard sensitive data. She could investigate all the sensitive datasets
that are closed for download, and use the noisy statistical answers to learn which datasets have
information useful for her research. Our PSI system is built to allow such immediate exploratory
access to these closed files and to reduce the wasted effort of researchers, data depositors, repositories
and IRBs coming from applications to access to datasets that eventually prove to not be useful to
the applicant.
The situation we have described above is schematically represented in Figure 1. When a data
analyst has access to a data repository infrastructure like Dataverse, they currently have only two
options: either using the publicly available data which are offered with open access, or going through
an authorization process that may be lengthy and costly. With PSI there will be a valuable alterna-
tive: accessing the sensitive data for data exploration. To enhance this opportunity, PSI is designed
to be naturally integrated with both the data repository infrastructure and data explorations tools.
4 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal mathematical framework for measuring the privacy guarantees pro-
vided by statistical computations. Consider an algorithm M that takes a dataset x as input and
performs a randomized computation to produce an output y. Informally, differential privacy re-
quires that if we change any one individual’s data in x, then the distribution of y does not change
much. Intuitively, this means that each individual’s data is hidden from an adversary that views
the output y.
To make this intuition precise, we need to define what we mean by “one individual’s data,” and
provide a measure of how much the distribution of y is allowed to change. For the former, a typical
choice is to consider datasets x that consist of n records, where we think of each record as consisting
of one individual’s data, and the sample size n is public (not sensitive information). We call two
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datasets x and x′ neighbors if they agree in all but one record (i.e. x′ is obtained from x by changing
one individual’s data). Then the formal definition of differential privacy is as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Differential Privacy, [25, 24]) For parameters  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a random-
ized algorithm M is (, δ)-differentially private if for every two neighboring datasets x, x′ and every
set S of outputs,
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probabilities are taken over the randomization of the algorithm M .
The level of privacy protection is governed by the two privacy loss parameters  and δ; the
smaller they are, the closer the distributions of M(x) and M(x′) are, and hence the greater the
level of privacy. Typically,  is taken to be a small constant such as .1, whereas δ is taken to be
very small, like 2−30.
The way that differentially private algorithms for statistical analysis are often designed are
by carefully introducing a small amount of random noise into non-private algorithms for the same
analyses. The more noise that is introduced, the greater the level of privacy protection (i.e. a smaller
 and/or δ). However, less noise produces a more accurate and useful analysis. Thus differentially
private algorithms offer a privacy-utility tradeoff.
In order to limit the amount of noise required, most differentially private algorithms for statistical
analysis require the number of data points and the explicit range of the different data variables.
A simple example is the mean of a numeric variable, the amount of noise needed to guarantee
differential privacy for it is proportional to its range divided by the number of data points.
By now, there is a large literature giving differentially private algorithms for a wide variety of
data analysis tasks. Often, these algorithms are accompanied by a theoretical analysis showing
that their performance converges to that of the non-private algorithm as the sample size n tends
to infinity. However, such asymptotic performance guarantees do not necessarily translate to good
performance at a specific finite sample size, and thus a great deal of work remains to be done to
engineer differentially private algorithms to be useful in practice.
In addition, one typically does not want to run just one analysis on a dataset, but rather a large
collection of analyses. Fortunately, differentially privacy satisfies a variety of composition theorems
showing that the privacy protection degrades gracefully when we run many differentially private
algorithms. For example:
Theorem 4.2 (Basic Composition [25, 24]) Let M1, . . . ,Mk be randomized algorithms where
Mi is (i, δi) differentially private for i = 1, . . . , k. Then the algorithm M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mk(x))
that runs each of the Mi’s using independent coin tosses is (
∑
i i,
∑
i δi) differentially private.
If we want to achieve a global, overall level of privacy protection given by (g, δg), we can think
of the pair as a “privacy budget” to be spent on different analysesMi we want to run. We can spend
more of this budget on a specific analysis Mi (i.e. take i, δi smaller), but this will consume more of
our budget, leaving less for the other analysis if we want to ensure that
∑
i i ≤ g and
∑
i δi ≤ δg.
There are better bounds on the composition of differentially private algorithms than the simple
summing bound given above [26, 38, 56], but they still have the same budget-like effect—a larger
(i, δi) (i.e. higher accuracy, lower privacy) for one computation requires reducing the  and δ values
for other computations in order to maintain the same overall level of privacy.
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5 Previous work
Most of the previous work to bring differential privacy to practice can be partitioned into the
following categories:
• Programming languages and systems: here the goal is to make it easier for users to write programs
that are guaranteed to be differentially private, either by composition of differentially private build-
ing blocks [50, 64, 34], using general frameworks such as “partition-and-aggregate” or “subsample-
and-aggregate” [60] to convert non-private programs into differentially private ones [67, 54], or by
formal verification from scratch [10]. On one hand, these methods provide much more generality
than we seek—our target users are not programmers, and it will already be very useful to provide
them with a small, fixed collection of differentially private versions of statistical computations that
are common in the social sciences. On the other hand, most of these tools do not provide much
guidance for a lay user in deciding how to partition a limited privacy budget among many statistics
or analyses he or she may want to run, or how to interpret the noisy results given by a differentially
private algorithm.
In contrast to the other tools mentioned above, GUPT [54] does enable a user to specify fine-
grained accuracy goals and automatically converts these into privacy budget allocations, in a similar
spirit to our privacy budgeting tool (described later). However, GUPT is limited to differentially
private programs obtained via the subsample-and-aggregate framework, whereas our tool has no such
restriction, and can be extended to include arbitrary differentially private algorithms. Moreover,
our tool allows the privacy budget allocation to be interactively adjusted by users, and supports
optimal composition theorems for differential privacy [56].
• Optimization for specific data releases: there have been several successful applications of differ-
ential privacy to very specific and structured sources of data like commuter patterns [46], mobility
data [52], client-side software data [30], and genome-wide association studies [16]
Here differential privacy experts carefully optimize the choice of differentially private algorithms
and the partitioning of the privacy budget to maximize utility for the particular data source. In
the context of a broad data repository in the social or health sciences, the collection of data sources
and the structure of the datasets is too heterogenous to allow for such optimization. And it is not
scalable to have a differential privacy expert manually involved in each instance of data sharing.
• Optimization and evaluation of specific algorithms: there is a vast literature on the design of
differentially private algorithms for specific data analysis tasks, including substantial experimental
work on comparing and optimizing such algorithms across a wide range of datasets. As an exam-
ple, the recent work on DPBench [35] provides a thorough comparison of different algorithms and
different ways of optimizing them.
Such work is complementary to ours. Algorithms that perform well in such evaluation are natural
candidates to add to our library of differentially private routines, but such evaluation does not
address how to budget the privacy allocated to this one algorithm against many other analyses
one might want to run on the same dataset or more generally how to enable lay users to make
appropriate use of differential privacy. Moreover, our use case of a general-purpose social science
data repository guides the choices of which algorithms to implement, the measures of accuracy, and
the methods for evaluation, as discussed in the later sections.
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There are also a number of deployed systems that provide query access to sensitive data, using
heuristic approaches to protect privacy. These include systems for querying clinical health data [45,
48], education data [4], genomic data [74], and Census data [1]. However, the lack of rigorous privacy
guarantees raises a genuine risk, as illustrated by attacks on the Israeli Census query system [80],
on genomic data [36, 28] and more generally on releases of aggregate statistics [20, 27]. (Some of
the aforementioned systems address this concern by limiting access to a more trusted set of users.)
6 Incentives for use
Differential privacy has sometimes been critiqued for its cost in utility (coming from the noise
introduced in statistics), thus one might wonder what would motivate researchers to use it in place
of the current data-sharing ecosystem. We see at least three different scenarios in which differential
privacy can provide a clear benefit over current approaches.
• (“DP works great”) In some circumstances, the results of differentially private analyses are vir-
tually indistinguishable from non-private analyses. Currently, this tends to be the case when the
number n of samples is large, the data is low-dimensional, and the analyses to be performed are
relatively simple and few in number. In such cases, the greater privacy protections of differential
privacy come essentially for free. As both theoretical and applied work on differential privacy ad-
vances and data gets “bigger” (n gets larger), we can expect an increasingly large set of data-sharing
circumstances to fall in this scenario.
• (“Access is wide”) When we wish to make sensitive data available to an extremely wide community
(for example, when allowing public access), we should be increasingly concerned about attacks from
individuals with malicious intent. Such adversaries can include ones who have extensive knowledge
about a particular data subject that can be exploited as background information. Thus, the strong
protections of differential privacy, which remain meaningful regardless of an adversary’s background
information, are attractive.
• (“Data is currently unavailable”) For data that is currently unavailable except possibly through
restrictive and time-consuming provisions, any useful statistical information that differential privacy
can offer is a benefit to utility, even if it does not fall in the “DP works great” category. In particular,
DP can offer the possibility of rough, exploratory analysis to determine whether a dataset is of
sufficient interest to go through the process of applying for access to the raw data.
The architecture of PSI is designed to support all three of these scenarios. In the near term, we
expect the third scenario, namely enabling exploratory analysis of data that is currently unavailable,
to be the one where PSI is most frequently used. In this scenario, PSI can provide a clear utility
benefit, can be applied with the modest sample sizes that are common in social science, and does not
require an extensive library of highly optimized and sophisticated differentially private algorithms.
However, PSI is extensible to incorporate such a library in the future, and we hope that eventually
it will be used more often in the other two scenarios as well, providing high-utility and privacy-
protective access to data that is currently shared in a less safe manner [18].
In the future, another potential incentive for the use of a differentially private data analysis
system like PSI is the automatic protection that differential privacy provides against false discovery,
allowing analysts to perform adaptive data exploration (without “preregistration”) and still have
confidence that the conclusions they draw are statistically valid [23, 11].
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We note that sometimes researchers do not wish to share their data, and are only using privacy
as an excuse. A system like PSI can help eliminate the excuse. Still, other external incentives
may be needed (such as from the research community, funding agencies, or journals) to encourage
sharing of data.
On exploratory analysis
Since it is our initial goal for the use of PSI, we elaborate on what we mean by supporting “ex-
ploratory data analysis.” This term generally refers to a wide-ranging set of techniques to empirically
learn features of data by inspection, and familiarize oneself with the nature of the data, or discover
apparent structure in the data [75]. It is inspection and discovery not driven by theory or model-
ing. In our setting of a social science data repository, we envision at least two uses for exploratory
analysis. For lay-users (e.g. members of the general public), exploratory analysis can be a way to
satisfy curiosity and discover interesting facts for situations where a statistically rigorous analysis
may not be necessary (e.g. for a high-school project). For a social science researcher, the goal
of exploratory analysis can be to determine which of the many datasets in the repository are of
most interest, so that the researchers only invest their time and effort in applying for raw access
to those datasets. Any final analyses they wish to perform and publish could then be done on the
raw data, not through the differentially private interface. This more modest near-term goal for PSI
compensates for the fact that we cannot perform the kinds of optimizations that might be done if
we had a differential privacy expert involved in each instance of data sharing.
7 Actors and Workflow
We have three different kinds of actors in PSI: data depositors, data curators, and data analysts.
Each of them has a different role and different requirements. We represent them, their interaction
and the threat model we consider, in terms of trust for different actors, in Table 1. We now detail
the roles and the expected expertise for each of them.
Data depositors. These are users that come to deposit their privacy-sensitive dataset in a data
repository, and may wish to make differentially private access to their dataset available. By inter-
acting with the system, the data depositor supplies basic information about the dataset (e.g. the
types and ranges of the variables), sets the overall privacy loss parameters, selects an initial set of
differentially private statistics to calculate and release, and determines how the remaining privacy
budget will be partitioned among future data analysts.
Data depositors are the ones with the initial ethical and/or legal responsibility for protecting the
privacy of their data subjects, and they (or their institutions) may be liable if they willfully violate
their obligations. Thus, they can be trusted to follow instructions (if not onerous or confusing)
and answer questions truthfully to the best of their knowledge. On the other hand, they cannot be
assumed to have expertise in differential privacy, computer science, or statistics, so any questions
that involve these areas are explained carefully in the system.
Data curators. These are the data-repository managers that maintain the hardware and software
on which PSI runs and the accompanying data repository infrastructure (e.g. Dataverse) and as-
sociated statistical tools (e.g. Zelig and TwoRavens). They are trusted, and indeed may also have
8
Actors Level of DP
trust expertise
data curators trusted modest
data depositors trusted none
data analysts semi-trusted none
(restricted)
data analysts untrusted none
(general public)
Table 1: Actors and their level of trust and required expertise.
legal obligations to ensure that the repository does not violate the privacy protections it claims
to offer through tools such as PSI. Data curators can be assumed to have expertise in IT systems
administration and data stewardship [32] and archiving [6], and can be trained to have at least a
modest background in statistics and differential privacy. But they are few in number, and cannot
be actively involved in most instances of data sharing or data exploration. Thus PSI is designed to
be sufficiently automated to enable data depositors and data analysts to safely use it on their own.
Data curators would also be responsible for deciding whether to accept new differentially private
routines into the library used by PSI and correcting bugs or security flaws found in existing routines.
These can be difficult tasks even for experts in differential privacy. Thus, in a future version of the
system, it would be of interest to minimize the amount of trusted code, and have tools to formally
verify the remaining components (both original components and later contributions), along the lines
of the programming languages tools described in Section 5.
Data analysts. These are users that come to access sensitive datasets in the repository, often
with the goal of data exploration as discussed in Section 6. They will have access to all of the
differentially private statistics selected by the data depositor, as well as the ability to make their
own differentially private queries (subject to staying within the overall privacy budget, as discussed
more below).
We envision at least two tiers of trust for data analysts once the system has active users. PSI can
make access available to a very wide community of analysts (e.g. the general public), in which case
the analysts are considered completely untrusted. Alternatively (or additionally), we can restrict to
a set of analysts that are identifiable (e.g. as registered users of the data repository), with some
accountability (e.g. through their verified affiliation with a home institution). Such analysts may
be considered semi-trusted, as we can assume that they will follow basic terms of use to not abuse
the system in certain ways. Specifically, we will assume that semi-trusted users will not collude to
compromise privacy, and will not create phony accounts. (This will enable us to provide greater
utility for such users, as discussed in Section 9.)
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8 Pedagogical Materials
In order to enable PSI to be used by empirical researchers without expertise in privacy, computer
science, or statistics, we have prepared pedagogical materials explaining differential privacy in an
intuitive but accurate manner, with a minimum of technical terminology and notation. These ma-
terials are meant to be sufficient for data depositors and data analysts to understand and make
appropriate choices in using PSI, such as those described in the forthcoming sections. Data depos-
itors require more background material than data analysts, as the former are concerned with the
privacy protections afforded to their data subjects, whereas the latter only need to understand the
impact of the system on their analyses (namely, that results will be less accurate or statistically
significant than would be obtained on the raw data, and that there is a limited “budget” of queries
that they can perform).
Relevant extracts of the pedagogical materials are offered in PSI at each decision point, and
can also be included when describing data-sharing plans to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). In
addition, members of our team have started to develop rigorous arguments showing that differential
privacy should be deemed to satisfy certain legal obligations of privacy protection, which can also be
used to reassure data depositors, data curators, and IRBs that differential privacy is a sufficiently
strong form of protection. For example, the combined legal and technical analysis in [59] provides
an argument that, when applied to educational data, differentially private computations satisfy the
requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [2].
As discussed in Section 7, we assume that data curators have expertise in IT systems adminis-
tration and data stewardship, and at least a modest background in statistics and differential privacy.
Thus, they do not need any specialized pedagogical materials other than a thorough documentation
of the system.
9 Privacy Budget Management
One of the challenges in enabling non-experts to use differential privacy is that it can be difficult to
understand the implications of different selections of the privacy loss parameters (namely ε and δ),
both in terms of privacy and utility, especially when these need to be distributed over many different
statistics to be computed. To address this issue, PSI is designed to expose these implications to
the user, in easy-to-understand terms, and is accompanied by a variety of simple explanations of
differential privacy and its parameters that are shown to the user at relevant times. We have
developed a privacy budgeting tool that guides users through judicious choices of global privacy
loss parameters, lets users select statistics to release, automatically distributes the privacy budget
across the chosen statistics, and exposes the resulting privacy-accuracy tradeoffs (see Figure 2.)
Global privacy loss parameters: The data depositor, who carries the initial responsibility for
protecting the privacy of her data subjects, is charged with setting the overall (“global”) privacy loss
parameters g, δg for her dataset (seen at the top right of Figure 2). To enable this choice, we provide
intuitive (but accurate!) explanations of the meaning of each of these privacy loss parameters, and
give recommended settings based on the level of sensitivity of a dataset (e.g. corresponding to
an institution’s established research data security levels, such as [3] or the similar categories in the
DataTags system that integrates with PSI [72]). δg is easily explained as the probability of arbitrary
leakage of information, like the probability of an adversary breaking an encryption scheme, and thus
should be set to be extremely small, like 2−30. For the main privacy loss parameter, g, we explain
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Figure 2: PSI budgeting interface: The left panel shows variables in the dataset; middle panel
elicits necessary metadata from depositors; right panel displays selections with a priori error esti-
mates, tailored to each statistic. For example, the error on the race histogram indicates the released
count for each bin will differ from the true count by at most 19.079 people with probability .95. The
upper right corner displays the privacy loss parameters and the functional boosts from secrecy of the
sample.
it with a table comparing an adversary’s posterior belief that a data subject has a sensitive trait
to the posterior belief had the subject opted out of the study. PSI also confirms with the data
depositor that each individual subject’s data corresponds to one row of the uploaded dataset (so
that the per-row protections of differential privacy translate to per-subject protections).
Secrecy of the sample: The data depositor is asked whether the dataset is a random sample
from a larger population, and whether the choice of this sample has been kept confidential. If so, a
useful lemma in differential privacy known as “secrecy of the sample” allows for an effective savings
in the privacy loss parameters corresponding to the ratio of sizes between the dataset and the larger
population.4 This means that correspondingly greater utility can be provided for the same level of
privacy protection. (To account for the fact that, in practice, population samples are typically not
perfectly random, the depositor is instructed to conservatively estimate the overall population size.)
Lemma 9.1 (Secrecy of the sample [40, 71]) LetM be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm
for datasets of size n. Let M ′ be a randomized algorithm that takes as input a dataset D of size
m ≥ n, and then runs M on a dataset D′ obtained by selecting a uniformly random subset of D’s
records of size n. Then, M ′ is ((e − 1) · (n/m), δ · (n/m))-differentially private.
In the application of this lemma in PSI, D′ represents a dataset that is being deposited in the
4https://adamdsmith.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/sample-secrecy/.
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repository, D represents a larger population from whichD′ was (randomly) drawn, andM represents
the differentially private statistics computed by PSI on D′. Note that in typical applications of
differential privacy,  is a small constant and therefore (e − 1) · n/m ≈  · n/m. In concrete
applications, especially in the social sciences, this lemma permits large savings in the privacy budget.
For this reason, we integrate this property in the budgeting interface (See Figure 2).
Budgeting among different statistics: Once global privacy loss parameters have been deter-
mined, users can select variables from their dataset (from the left-hand panel of the budgeting
interface, Figure 2) and choose statistics to release about those variables from PSI’s library of dif-
ferentially private algorithms. At this stage, there is still the challenge of how the global privacy loss
parameters should be distributed among the different statistics to be computed. That is, for each
statistic to be computed, we need to select privacy loss parameters (i.e. set i and δi for statistic i)
and then apply composition theorems to ensure that globally, we achieve (g, δg) differential privacy.
This leaves the question of how a user should select individual privacy loss parameters i (and
δi). The larger the value of i is taken, the more utility we obtain from the i’th statistic, but this
leaves less of the global privacy budget remaining for the other statistics. Since some statistics a
user is computing may be more important than others, and different differentially private algorithms
have different privacy-utility tradeoffs, the “best” use of the privacy budget is likely to involve a
non-uniform distribution of the i’s.
To enable users to determine this partition without requiring that they be privacy experts,
PSI automatically assigns initial privacy loss parameters to each chosen statistic. Similarly to
GUPT [54], PSI then exposes the privacy-accuracy tradeoffs to the user (see the summary table
in the right-hand panel of Figure 2.) Rather than adjusting the individual privacy loss parameters
i, the user can instead modify the “accuracy” that will be obtained for different selected statistics
(presented as, for example, the size of 95% confidence intervals; see further discussion in the next
section). For each differentially private algorithm in PSI, there are accompanying functions that
translate between the privacy loss parameters and a measure of accuracy (also depending on other
metadata, such as the range of variables involved and the dataset size n). These functions are
used by the privacy budgeting tool to translate the accuracy bounds into individual privacy loss
parameters and ensure that the global privacy loss parameters are not exceeded.
Optimal composition: To ensure that we get the most utility out of the global privacy budget,
we use the Optimal Composition Theorem [56], which in fact was developed for the purpose of our
privacy budget tool. This characterizes the optimal value for the global privacy budget g (for each
possible δg ∈ [0, 1)) when composing k algorithms that are (i, δi)-DP.
Theorem 9.2 (Optimal Composition Theorem, [56]) LetM1, . . . ,Mk be randomized algorithms
where Mi is (i, δi) differentially private for i = 1, . . . , k and let δg ∈ [0, 1). Then the algorithm
M(x) = (M1(x), . . . ,Mk(x)) that runs each of the Mi’s using independent coin tosses is (g, δg)
differentially private for the least value of g satisfying the following inequality:
1∏k
i=1(1 + e
i)
·
∑
S⊆{1,...,k}
max
{
e
∑
i∈S i − eg · e
∑
i 6∈S i , 0
}
≤ 1− 1− δg∏k
i=1(1− δi)
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While the Basic Composition Theorem gives an upper bound on the degradation of privacy
under composition, the above theorem is optimal in the sense that for every set of privacy loss
parameters, (i, δi) for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and δg there exists a set of algorithms M1, . . . ,Mk that are
(i, δi) differentially private, respectively, whose composition achieves (g, δg) differential privacy
exactly.
For even moderate values of k, the optimal composition theorem can provide substantial savings
in the privacy budget over the other composition theorems in differential privacy. In an effort
to maximize utility for users, the budgeting interface uses an implementation of Theorem 9.2 to
apportion a global epsilon value across several statistics. Since the Optimal Composition Theorem is
infeasible to compute in general, we use an efficient approximation algorithm that still outperforms
the alternative composition theorems [56].
Budgeting among different actors: Recall that the selection of differentially private statistics
to be computed is done both by the data depositor, who selects an initial set of statistics that will
be all who access the dataset, and by individual data analysts, who may be carrying out novel
explorations of their own conception. The privacy budgeting tool described above is designed to
support both types of actors (with slightly different settings for each to reflect their different roles
and level of trustworthiness). The data depositor is tasked with deciding how much of the global
privacy budget g to reserve for future data analysts. For example, if the data depositor uses up d
units of privacy for the statistics she chooses to release, then at least a = g − d units of privacy
will be left for the future analysts. (a might actually be larger, since composition theorems for
differential privacy can in some cases give better bounds than simply summing the privacy loss
parameters.)
In a future version of PSI different tiers of access will be defined for data analysts. In the case
of semi-trusted data analysts (who we assume will not collude, as discussed in Section 7), PSI will
provide each analyst a per-user privacy budget of a.
In the case of completely untrusted analysts, we will share a among all future analysts. The
incorporation of these tiers of access into the system is under development. The latter model is
more conservative with respect to privacy protection, and thus may be appropriate when analysts
do not have the sufficient accountability or the data is highly sensitive (e.g. with life-or-death or
criminal implications). The downside of the more conservative model is that it is vulnerable to a
denial-of-service attack, where the first few data analysts, intentionally or inadvertently, deplete
the entire privacy budget, leaving future analysts unable to make any queries. This can be partly
mitigated by rate-limiting the use of the privacy budget and by sharing all statistics computed
publicly. It is also possible to reserve part of the privacy budget for untrusted analysts and part for
trusted analysts, with each part being treated as described above.
Budgeting for Interactive and Adaptive Queries: An additional subtlety in privacy budget-
ing comes from the fact that data analysts may choose their privacy loss parameters (i, δi) adap-
tively, depending on the results of previous queries. In such a case, it is natural to try to use
composition theorems as privacy filters [66] — for example, the k’th query would be allowed only if
its privacy loss parameters (k, δk) do not cause the inequality of the Optimal Composition Theorem
(Thm. 9.2) to be violated. Unfortunately, as shown in [66], this strategy does not in general yield
(g, δg) differential privacy overall. However, more restrictive bounds, such as Basic Composition
(Thm. 4.2), do yield valid privacy filters. Consequently, for interactive queries for data analysts in
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PSI, the Optimal Composition Theorem (and its approximations) is only used within (non-adaptive)
batches of queries; to compose across different batches, we use Basic Composition.
10 Differentially Private Algorithms
Choice of Statistical Procedures: While PSI is designed to be easily extensible so as to incor-
porate new algorithms from the rapidly expanding literature, the initial set of differentially private
algorithms in PSI were chosen to support the most necessary statistics that are needed to provide
immediate utility for social science research and data exploration. Specifically, we include:
• Univariate descriptive statistics, such as means, quantiles, histograms, and approximate cumu-
lative distribution functions. From some of these, post-processing can also provide additional de-
scriptive statistics at no additional privacy cost.
• Basic statistical estimators, for inference about the population from which a dataset was sampled.
We have selected some of the most widely used statistical inference procedures in social science,
such as matching algorithms and difference-of-means tests for causal inference, and low-dimensional
linear, logit, probit and poisson regression.
• Per-row transformations for creating new features (variables) out of combinations of already exist-
ing ones. These allow the previously described procedures to be leveraged to do more sophisticated
computations on a broader range of questions 5.
We have chosen to initially implement differentially private versions of statistical methods that
are widely used in social science6 and where the differentially private algorithms give good perfor-
mance at sample sizes we found in social science research. For our evaluation, that we will report in
Section 15, we have examined 80 such datasets from published works that used methods available
in our differentially private library.
These choices are also motivated in part by the data exploration tools that PSI will integrate
with, and which we expect our data analysts to use. In particular, the TwoRavens graphical data
exploration tool (http://2ra.vn) provides descriptive statistics for each variable in a dataset, as
well as graphical illustrations of its empirical distribution (e.g. a histogram or a probability density
function) [22]. PSI replaces these with the differentially private descriptive statistics it computes.
Per-row transformations allow for building more sophisticated analysis. Indeed, these transfor-
mations and univariate means are sufficient to express all the statistical queries in the sense of [41].
In order to allow only transformations that are safe, PSI allows only transformations that are per-
row and that come from a restricted domain-specific language. This language also allows for either
specifying or automatically inferring ranges for transformed variables from those of the original
5For example, the (empirical) covariance between two attributes can be estimated by estimating the mean of a
new attribute that is the product of the two original attributes (as well as the means of the original attributes), or
the mean of a variable in a subpopulation can be computed from the mean of the product of that variable with a
binary indicator for the subpopulation of interest, and the mean of the indicator.
6For example Krueger and Lewis-Beck [44] in a survey of all 1796 quantitative articles published between 1990
and 2005 in three leading political science journals find that 30% use simple linear regression, and a further 25% use
either Logit or Probit regression. Similar studies show regression is used in 18% of published articles in psychology,
25% in the education research [73] and over 40% of articles in the New England Journal of Medicine [68], while in
Public Health, 20% use regression and 43% use Logit or Probit models [39].
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variables, so that these can still be enforced for the transformed variables. A more comprehensive
discussion of the variable transformations is in Section 13.
Measuring Accuracy: The choice of accuracy measure, and how to represent it to users, is im-
portant both in the privacy budgeting tool as well as for data exploration by data analysts, who
need to know how to interpret the noisy statistics provided by differential privacy. For descriptive
statistics, we have determined that 95% confidence intervals are the simplest and most intuitive
way to represent the noise introduced by differential privacy.
For many of the basic differentially private algorithms for descriptive statistics (such as the
Laplace mechanism [25]), a theoretical worst-case analysis is also indicative of typical performance,
so we use this to calculate the a priori privacy-accuracy translation needed in the privacy budgeting
tool.
For statistical inference procedures, the accuracy (e.g. size of a confidence interval obtained) is
necessarily data-dependent, even without privacy. (For example, using a t-test for mean estimation
gives a confidence interval of size that depends on the empirical variance of the data.) When
incorporating such methods, PSI uses conservative confidence intervals, meaning that it ensures
that the differentially private confidence interval includes the true value with probability at least
.95. Intuitively, we account for the noise introduced by differential privacy by making the confidence
intervals larger — this ensures that analysts do not draw incorrect conclusions from the differentially
private statistics (but more analyses may come out inconclusive, as we explain to users of the
system). To provide the a priori accuracy bounds needed by the privacy budgeting tool, we intend
to use “rules of thumb” based on experimental evaluation given n, , the number of variables, and
other available metadata.
11 Software Architecture
We have implemented a prototype of PSI that is ready for preliminary deployment in a data repos-
itory. As mentioned throughout the text, some features are still under development. In this section
we will describe the current implementation.
Metadata: Archival data for a research study are commonly stored on repositories as an original
data file, and a complementary meta-data file. The original data file contains the raw numeric
values of observations in the dataset. The meta-data file contains auxiliary information about the
dataset that increases its ability to be reused by researchers; this might include text descriptions of
the variables, summary statistics, provenance [14] and numerical fingerprints for validation[6]. The
largest repositories have shared standards for how this meta-data file should be constructed [77, 12],
so that catalogs of data can be built across repositories [49, 65], and software utilities can be reused
and deployed across different institutions [79].
Some of the information that gets recorded in the metadata we consider public, such as the names
and text descriptions of the meanings of the variables and the sample size. Some of the metadata,
such as variable-level summary statistics, contains private information, even if aggregated. Thus if
the dataset contains private information, we consider its metadata to also be a private file that could
potentially leak information. It is compliant with the shared standards, however, for metadata to
have missing or empty fields, so we can construct a reduced version of the private metadata, that only
contains public information. To this we can add differentially private versions of certain summary
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Figure 3: Architecture diagram.
statistics, and still distribute the metadata file for public use, so long as the total privacy loss
after composition (see section 9) is below the appropriate global parameter. We call this the public
metadata.
The bottom of Figure 3 shows the private raw data, its accompanying private metadata, and the
public metadata, residing in a storage layer in our system. Surrounding them are the application
layer tools for differential privacy, which run on a remote server. The differentially private algo-
rithms, the accuracy estimates, and the budgeting coordinated by the composition theorem, each
discussed previously, are all implemented in the R programming language, which is widely used
in the statistics and quantitative social science communities [63]. We describe how they interlink
below, as we trace out user’s interaction with the system. We expect to distribute all of these
routines as an R package for easy reuse within the R environment (independently of Dataverse and
TwoRavens). In addition to this code on the server, there are client layer interfaces (written as thin
HTML Javascript GUI’s) that allow different types of users to interact with the system, but no
direct access to the raw data. We now describe our different key users (the same as introduced in
section 7), and how their respective interfaces interact with the larger system, in turn.
Depositor Interaction: At the time of budgeting the depositor interface or privacy budgeting
interface, as for example in Figure 2, allows the data depositor to construct a list of statistics
they would like to release on the dataset. This interface has no direct access to either the data or
computations on the data; whenever the page requires a new computation,7 it copies the contents
of the current page to a remote application that uses differential privacy composition theorems
to re-partition the privacy budget among the current set of statistics (by scaling all of the i’s
by the largest multiplicative factor that stays within the global privacy budget), and recalculates
7As when the metadata for a statistic is completed, or a statistic is deleted, or when an accuracy value, or any
global parameter is edited.
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the corresponding accuracies. This remote process then recomputes and returns an updated list
of privacy loss parameters and accuracy estimates associated with each selected statistic. The
frontend interface then rewrites the summary table in the right-hand panel of Figure 2 with these
newly provided values, and waits for more actions from the user until another round of computation
is required. The backend composition process is memoryless, in the sense that no past version of the
page persists or is stored, but every request of the backend begins an entirely new set of budgeting
and accuracy computations. For this reason, the connection between the frontend and backend does
not have to be persistent.
When the depositor has finalized the list of statistics she wishes to make available, together with
their privacy loss parameters, a table containing the chosen statistics and their associated metadata
and privacy loss parameters is then submitted to another separate remote release application that
computes all the DP statistics requested. This release tool checks the composition of the request
with a trusted version of the composition application, which means that code to this point does
not have to be trusted, so long as the global  can be verified. This is detailed on Figure 3 as a
split box, representing that there are two instances of the same code, one listening and replying to
client requests, which does not have to be trusted, and another copy that has to be trusted, but
only interacts with the backend, and has no web connection so is easier to protect. The release tool
is the only process that has access to the raw data which sits in secure storage in the Dataverse
repository. The application that calculates the DP releases does not reply to the depositor interface.
The architecture diagram in Figure 3, shows the directions of communication between every piece of
the system and one can trace out from this that any path from the raw data to any data analyst (or
even the data depositor), has to pass through the DP channel from this application to the release
of a differentially private value written to a metadata file.
Analyst Interaction: The differentially private statistics that are generated are released in a file of
metadata associated with the securely archived data. Everything in this metadata file can be made
available for public browsing. In Figure 3, we show an untrusted public analyst who does not need
to prove any credentials, and is able to access the public metadata file with the differentially private
releases. The public analysts can use the public metadata file in whatever manner they prefer.
However, since all this information is written in the repository metadata standards, a difficult to
read XML file, we provide an explorer interface that presents the information in a more easily
interpretable graphical form, using a modified version of the TwoRavens software [37], described
in the next section. This is a statistical platform that allows users to explore data in repositories
by means of their metadata, so is a good match for this application where only the metadata is
available to the user.
Once PSI is integrated with a data repository, we will provide another tier of access to semi-
trusted users. These are users for which the depositor has granted a user-specific privacy budget a
from which they can generate additional differentially private releases, beyond those included in the
public release. We expect these users will have some distinct university or research affiliation which
can be verified by credentials and agree to terms of use.8 Their explorer interface includes both
the exploratory ability of the untrusted analyst interface, and the budgeting ability of the depositor
interface. Again, these users can construct a list of queries they would like to make, partitioning
their personal a budgets among them, by assistance of the composition application.
8For example, Dataverse verifies members of certain universities by Shibboleth [55] using the Security Assertion
Markup Language protocol.
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When they have a batch of statistics whose accuracies they find useful, the statistics are sub-
mitted to the differentially private release function which checks that the composition of statistics
meets the available budget using a trusted copy of the composition application. This may occur in
several adaptive rounds, as they learn things about the data that inform their further exploration,
until their budget is exhausted. Each semi-trusted user will have their own personal metadata file.
This will start out with the same information in the public metadata, but each release will add the
additional differentially private releases that have been paid from that user’s personal a budget.
Only the semi-trusted user will have access to this metadata file, by means of their credentials, and
specifically in the terms of use we are trusting they will accord to, they will have agreed not to
share these values in collusion with other users (as discussed in the trust model in Section 7).
Security of the prototype: In developing PSI we concentrated on design choices that maximize
its usefulness for its potential user community. Nevertheless, we addressed also several of the secu-
rity and side-channel vulnerabilities that have been raised in the literature about implementations
of differential privacy [34, 54]. Most of these concerns are mitigated by our design choices. For
example, PSI only allows its users to select built-in differentially private data analyses and run
variable transformations before them, rather than allowing arbitrary analyses that are then au-
tomatically verified or converted to satisfy DP. This restriction comes naturally with our goal of
allowing exploratory data analysis by users without programming expertise. More details on the
vulnerabilities and how PSI addresses them are Section 13.
12 Exploration Interface
Figure 4: Explorer graphical user interface for inspecting differentially private released values, adapt-
ing TwoRavens platform.
As described in the previous section, all released differentially private values are written to
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metadata files, either public files or (in a future version of the system) files belonging to only one
user. These files can be used by the permitted analyst in whatever manner they prefer, but we
provide in our system a user-friendly interface to read the information stored in the metadata. The
TwoRavens platform for statistical inference (http://2ra.vn) is an interface that allows users, at
all levels of statistical expertise, to browse data on repositories, explore summary statistics and
build statistical models on those datasets by means of directed graphs [37, 22]. The interface is
a browser-based, thin client, with the data remaining in an online repository, and the statistical
modeling occurring on a remote server. The data remains in the repository and never goes to the
browser; rather the statistical exploration is achieved by remote statistical processing and moving
the correct metadata to the browser. This architecture works well with the PSI system since it relies
solely on metadata, and we have been adapting some of the graphs and summary tables available to
convey to the user the additional uncertainty inherent in dealing with differentially private releases
from noisy mechanisms, for example, providing confidence intervals for differentially private values,
and histograms and density plots that represent the uncertainty in the values due to noise.
13 Security
The initial prototypes of PSI do not address all of the security and side-channel issues that have
been raised in the literature about implementations of differential privacy [34, 54]. We feel that a
higher priority is evaluating whether the design of PSI is useful for its potential user community,
and if the answer is positive, security issues can be addressed in a future version, before it is used
to handle highly sensitive data.
13.1 Timing, state and privacy budget attacks
Haeberlen et al. [34] analyze the possible attacks to a differential privacy system working in a
centralized scenario similar to the one we described in Section 7. In their scenario, data analysts are
allowed to submit arbitrary analyses to the differential privacy system and the system is responsible
for running these analyses if they pass some formal requirements guaranteeing differential privacy
and if there is still some budget left. Even if these formal requirements guarantee differential privacy,
this model is prone to three main kinds of side channel attacks:
Timing attacks The data analysis may leak information about an individual using a timing (or
any other covert) channel.
State attacks The data analysis may leak information about an individual through an observable
change in the application state, for instance by using a global variable.
Privacy budget attacks The data analysis may leak information about an individual by running
a subanalysis that fails because of lack of privacy budget.
Most of these attacks can be implemented only if data analysts are allowed to submit arbitrary
data analyses. In PSI a data analyst can only select built-in differentially private data analysis and
run variable transformations before them. Using only built-in differentially private data analysis
prevents these attacks at data analysis time. For instance, there is no risk of a privacy budget
attack since queries cannot run subanalyses that can exhaust the privacy budget. Nevertheless,
data analysts can submit to PSI variable transformations that can create new features by combining
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existing ones as we discussed in Section 10, and these raise a greater risk of timing attacks and state
attacks, which we discuss in the next section.
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Figure 5: Workflow schema for safe variable transformations.
13.1.1 Safe variable transformations
An important property of differential privacy is closure under post-processing.
Lemma 13.1 (Post-processing, [25]) Let M be a (, δ)-differentially private randomized algo-
rithm from9 Xn to Y , and f be an arbitrary (possibly randomized) map from Y to Z. Then, the
composition of M and f , denoted f ◦M is a (, δ)-differentially private algorithm from Xn to Z.
This says that the result of a differentially private computation can be safely given as input to
any other transformation and the differentially privacy property will be maintained. The situation
is more involved when transformations occur before applying a differentially private mechanism.
Indeed, if we fix a differentially private algorithm M from Xn to Y and we arbitrarily pre-process
its input dataset z ∈ Zn with an arbitrary map f from Zn to Xn we can break its privacy guarantee.
As a simple example, consider a differentially private mechanism that approximately releases the
fraction of the individuals with a particular feature B in a database with n records, and a map f
that returns a database with n records with the feature B in the case John Doe is in the database,
and that removes all the elements with feature B, otherwise. When n is sufficiently large, a data
analyst observing the result of M ◦ f can determine with high probability whether John Doe is
in the database or not. Fortunately, there is a class of important transformations that preserves
differential privacy: per-row transformations.
Lemma 13.2 (Per-row transformations) LetM(x1, . . . , xn) be a (, δ)-differentially private ran-
domized algorithm10 from Xn to Y , and f be a map from Z to X. Then, the composition of f and
M , denoted
(M ◦ f)(z1, . . . , zn) =M(f(z1), . . . , f(zn))
is a (, δ)-differentially private randomized algorithm from Zn to Y .
This kind of transformation can be very useful in practice. For instance, as we mentioned before,
the (empirical) covariance between two attributes can be estimated by estimating the mean of a
9We use Xn to describe the possible set of databases with n records of type X.
10We make here explicit the fact that M is a function of the records x1, . . . , xn of the input dataset.
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new attribute that is the product of the two original attributes (as well as the means of the original
attributes), or the mean of a variable in a subpopulation can be computed from the mean of the
product of that variable with a binary indicator for the subpopulation of interest, and the mean of
the indicator.
However, one must be careful in using this lemma. Indeed, if the input data is Zn one must
consider the possible change of attributes in Xn when reasoning about the differentially private
algorithmM . Let see this with an example. Consider the case where we want a differentially private
estimate of the mean of a new attribute C that is the product of the two original attributes A,B.
A differentially private algorithm for computing the mean must choose noise that is proportional to
the range of the attribute. Suppose that we know the range of A and B is [a, b] for a, b ≥ 0. When
we choose the noise forM we need to reason about the range of C which is not [a, b] but it is [a2, b2]
instead.
In order to allow only transformations that are safe in the sense discussed above, PSI takes an
approach similar to the one of AIRAVAT [67] and requires the data curators and the data analysts
to provide the ranges of each variable before and after the transformations and enforces them at
runtime, i.e. the differentially private algorithms, truncate values that are outside the specified
range. This guarantees the correct use of the principle formalized in Lemma 13.2 and so privacy is
preserved.
To support the design of transformations PSI uses a restricted domain-specific language and an
automated program analysis tracking variable ranges. The workflow of variable transformations is
described in Figure 5. Starting from the private dataset D, a variable transformation generates a
new private dataset D′, containing the same individuals as D but with potentially new variables,
on which the differentially private algorithm is run. In this example, the transformation creates a
new attribute C as the product of A and B. This is performed per-row and the program analysis
forwards the information about the range from the inputs (in this example the range for both A
and B is [0, 2]) to the newly generated variable (in this example the range for C is then [0, 4]). This
range is provided to the user who can decide to keep it or to use a different range. The differentially
private algorithm will then enforce this range and add noise proportional to it.
The language for variable transformations allows only statistical operations that combine, trans-
form or separate variables in a value independent way. This prevents high-level timing attacks —
ones where the timing leakage is intentional — even if it doesn’t prevent fine-grained timing analysis
on numerical computations, as we will discuss below. Moreover, to protect against state attacks, the
language for variable transformations only allows access to locally defined variables. The program
analysis is based on a flow-sensitive type system that is used to guarantee that information about
the changes in the ranges of variables are propagated to the output.
Summing up, our approach of separating variable transformations from the differentially private
data analysis (whose code is not accessible by the data analyst) guarantees protection against
privacy budget attacks. The use of a domain specific language further protects against state attacks
and (high-level) timing attacks. Finally, the enforcement of the variable ranges at runtime prevents
the misuse of the variable transformations. To help the user decide the range for each variable, the
domain specific language uses a program analysis propagating range information from the input to
the output.
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13.1.2 Floating-point rounding attack
Another attack is the floating-point rounding attack identified by Mironov [53]. The idea of this
attack is to exploit the irregularities in floating-point implementations of some basic algorithms like
the Laplace mechanism. When the output is numeric, differential privacy requires every output
to be feasible, i.e. being returned with some probability for every input, and outputs to have
similar probabilities when the inputs differ by an individual. Mironov showed instead that naive
implementations of differential privacy lead to results that are concentrated on subsets of outputs.
Even worse, it can be the case that for neighboring databases some outputs may only be possible
under one of the two databases. This allows adversaries to distinguish the output distributions of
the two database with certainty and violate differential privacy.
The solution proposed by Mironov is to use the snapping mechanism [53, 21] which essentially
tosses out the least significant bits of the differentially private floating-point outputs using a combi-
nation of clamping and rounding procedures. This mechanism is also effective when the mechanism
is instantiated with imperfect randomness. We have implemented the snapping mechanism and
incorporated it into the library of differentially private algorithms that underlies the system. How-
ever, we found that it has poor utility when compared to the typical Laplace mechanism so at this
stage we do not offer it as a default through the interface.
13.1.3 Fine-grained side channels attacks
Side channel attacks are in general difficult to prevent. We discussed before how the use of built-in
differentially private primitives and a domain specific language for variable transformations can help
in mitigating timing channels. Nevertheless, the current implementation may still be prone to fine
grained attacks like the one by [7] exploiting time leakages due to floating points computations. We
expect these kinds of attacks to be further mitigated by the fact that PSI is only accessed remotely
and so some of these fine grained observations are absorbed by delays in the communication.
We expect that by using an execution environment where statistical operations have value-
independent cost, which can be achieved by padding thanks to the restricted setting, by using some
of the proposed mitigations [7], and by having PSI only accessed remotely we can prevent further
vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, we leave a complete evaluation of these vulnerabilities to a future
version of our prototype.
14 Usability testing
We conducted thorough usability testing of PSI, seeing 28 participants in total. UI testing was
broken into three phases: a pre-pilot phase (n = 3), a pilot phase (n = 5), and a full study
(n = 20). After each phase of testing, improvements were made to both the tool and the study
protocols based on feedback from the participants. Because the study procedures differed in the
three phases and the participants in the full study tested a more up to date version of the tool than
was used in the pilot phases, we will primarily focus on the full study in this section. User testing
was conducted on a pared down version of the system.
We tested the workflow of data depositors releasing univariate statistics through the privacy
budgeting interface. From a user perspective, the acts of releasing multivariate statistics and using
the interactive query interface involve very similar procedures to the ones required for only releasing
univariate statistics through the budgeting interface. For this reason, we focused on a core set of
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tasks that would shed light on the usability of the whole system while minimizing the fatigue
of research participants. The tool for variable transformations discussed in Section 13 was not
integrated into the system at the time of testing so has only undergone internal testing and will be
evaluated in future rounds of user experiments as more features are added to the system.
All participants were over 18 years old and had some experience with data analysis, either
through courses, work, or research. The study was approved by Harvard’s Institutional Review
Board and all participants were compensated with a $20 gift card to Amazon for sessions lasting
about one hour. In the full study, participants’ education levels varied, with 10% having completed
some college, 25% with a Bachelor’s degree, 50% with a Master’s degree, and 15% having attained
a PhD. 35% of participants reported being unfamiliar with differential privacy, 50% said they were
somewhat familiar, 10% described themselves as familiar, 5% were very familiar and nobody reported
being an expert in differential privacy.
Study procedures The user tests were designed to simulate the experience of data depositors.
First, participants were asked to read brief introductory text in PSI broadly describing the purpose
of the tool, the concept of differential privacy and privacy loss parameters, the need for metadata,
and the idea behind secrecy of the sample. Next the participants were given a scenario designed to
simulate the mindset of a data depositor. They were given a toy dataset in Excel containing the
demographic information (age, sex, income, education level, race, and marital status) of 1000 people
sampled randomly from a county with population 700,000. They were told that their goal was to
advertise their dataset to other social scientists who were interested in the relationship between race
and income for people of various ages. After reviewing the dataset, participants were asked to set
privacy loss parameters for the scenario and were given a choice whether or not to use the secrecy
of the sample feature.
After setting privacy loss parameters, participants in the full study were led through a sequence
of 11 tasks using the interface. The tasks all related to the scenario and toy dataset and required
participants to effectively use each feature of the tool, guiding them through the typical workflow
of a data depositor. The tasks are listed below with each of the features being tested indicated in
parentheses.
1. You just entered a tutorial mode in the interface that will highlight some key features of the tool. Go through
the tutorial and, when prompted, select a mean of the Age variable as your first statistic. (Tutorial mode,
selecting statistics, inputting metadata).
2. You decide that the income and race variables are also important for future researchers, so you decide to
release statistics for these. Add a mean and a quantile for income, as well as a histogram for race. (Selecting
statistics, inputting metadata).
3. You no longer wish to include a quantile for income. Delete this statistic. (Deleting statistics).
4. You decide that you want to be very confident in your error estimates. Use the tool to set a 98 percent
confidence level. (Adjusting confidence level).
5. You are thinking about your dataset, and you realize that it contains some information that makes it more sen-
sitive than you originally thought. Use the tool to make the changes necessary to reflect this shift. (Adjusting
privacy loss parameters).
6. You have just been informed by a colleague that your dataset was actually randomly sampled from a population
of size 1,200,000. Use the tool to make changes to reflect this. Does this make your statistics more or less
accurate? (Secrecy of the sample).
7. You decide that it would be useful to allow other researchers who do not have access to your raw data to make
some of their own selections for statistics to calculate from your dataset. Use the tool to make changes to
reflect this. (Reserving privacy budget for data analysts).
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8. How much error is there for the mean age statistic? What does this number mean? (Interpreting error
estimates).
9. Make it so that the released mean age is off from its true mean by at most one year. Is this more or less
accurate than what you had before? (Redistributing privacy budget via error estimates).
10. Make it so that each count in the released race histogram is off from the true count by at most 5 people without
changing the error you just set for mean age. (Redistributing privacy budget, hold feature).
11. You are satisfied with your statistics and your error estimates. Finalize your selections. (Submitting statistics).
In the two pilot phases, the tasks were much less specific and simply asked participants to use
the tool to release some useful statistics about their dataset. Pilot participants reported feeling
overwhelmed by the open-ended nature of this request so we modified the tasks in the full study to
specifically target each feature of the tool.
Audio recording was used during tasks and participants were asked to speak their thoughts
out loud as much as possible, which provided valuable qualitative feedback. For each participant,
time spent on each task was recorded. Errors were also recorded and classified as either Critical
Errors (CEs), in which the participant made choices that led to the inability to complete the task,
and Non-critical Errors (NCEs), where participants corrected their own errors and were able to
successfully complete the task despite early mistakes.
Results Overall, participants performed well, committing relatively few critical errors during
the tasks. The most common mistakes occurred when entering metadata, with every participant
reporting some doubt over what values to enter and 45% of participants entering values at some
point in the session that would lead to poor results. 30% of participants had some degree of trouble
figuring out how to redistribute their privacy budget across their statistics (by raising or lowering
the corresponding accuracy estimate). The basic functionalities of selecting and deleting statistics,
modifying global parameters, and submitting the statistics for differentially private release came
easily to most participants. Mistakes tended to recur across subjects, clearly highlighting the more
difficult features of the tool. A quantitative summary of the task results can be found in Table 6.
Anecdotally, most participants said the documentation was helpful but should be simpler, shorter,
and distributed as needed throughout the tool. Unsolicited, four participants reported having fun
using the tool.
There was no significant relationship between familiarity with differential privacy and the to-
tal number of critical or non-critical errors participants made. Likewise, there was no significant
relationship between education level and the total number of critical or non-critical errors made.
PSI puts some privacy-critical decisions into the hands of its users, making precise documen-
tation, intuitive design, and thorough error-handling imperative. There are three ways that data
depositors could accidentally leak more information about their data than intended: mistakenly
setting overly large privacy loss parameters, overestimating the size of the population using the
secrecy of the sample feature, or entering values directly from the raw data as metadata in the tool
(note that none of these violations is possible for data analysts). Over all participants including the
two pilot phases and all tasks, 0 people overestimated the population size when using the secrecy of
the sample feature even though the majority of participants elected to use it. One participant in the
pilot phase entered empirical range values from the toy dataset in the metadata field. In reaction to
this, we added an additional warning about the risks of data-dependent decisions in the tool which
was heeded by all 20 members of the full study. Only one participant of the 28 made an unsafe
choice regarding the privacy loss parameters by accidentally switching  and δ, setting  = 10−6
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Task Average timeon task (secs) # CEs # NCEs
1 349.9 2 1
2 289.7 9 6
3 8.2 2 1
4 29.8 2 0
5 53.7 4 2
6 30.1 1 0
7 95.8 5 1
8 34.3 2 0
9 20.3 5 3
10 52.4 6 3
11 20.6 0 0 l
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Figure 6: Performance on usability tasks: Average time on task is reported only for participants
who successfully completed the task. The # CEs and # NCEs columns list the number of people who
committed at least one critical error or non-critical error, respectively, during the task. On the right
is a box plot of System Usability Scale scores for PSI. The black vertical line is the median (73.6)
and the red vertical line is the mean (69.6). The circle represents one outlier in the data.
and δ = .25. Although a rare event, we have taken this error seriously and have implemented more
rigorous checks on the privacy loss parameters to prevent similar accidents in the future. All other
participants followed the instructions in the documentation, setting  to a small constant ( values
chosen by all other participants ranged from .05 to 1) and δ to a negligible number (range: 10−7
to 10−5). These results suggest that the system is designed in such a way that makes it difficult to
violate privacy even for users who make many mistakes while using the tool.
At the end of the usability test, participants were asked to rank how relevant they think PSI is
for people who collect human-subjects data on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least relevant
and 5 being the most. The average relevance rating given to the project was 4.3. We view this as
an indication that people both recognize data privacy as an important issue and believe that PSI
would successfully address a need in this space.
System Usability Scale After the tasks, participants filled out the System Usability Scale (SUS)
[13], a ten item questionnaire that is widely employed in usability studies to assess the quality of a
user interface. The SUS is easy to administer and though only ten questions, has been shown to be
a reliable and valid measure of usability [69, 9]. The ten questions are on a five point Likert scale
and yield a total score between 0 and 100, which should not be interpreted as a percentile or letter
grade.
In the full study, the mean SUS score given to PSI was 69.6 with a median score of 73.6. A box
and whisker plot of SUS scores can be seen in Figure 6. There was one strong outlier in the data,
more than 2.5 standard deviations below the mean. Removing this outlier gives a mean SUS score
of 72.5 and a median of 75. These scores are better than the system’s average score in the pilot
study of 59.5, suggesting that changes made to the tool between the pilot and the full study made
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the system significantly more usable. There was no significant relationship between SUS scores and
familiarity with differential privacy nor education level.
Two meta-analyses have been conducted on a wide range of usability studies and found average
SUS scores across all systems to be 69.7 [9] and 68.0 [69], respectively. There has also been work
on associating labels with SUS scores [9] including: Worst Imaginable, Awful, Poor, OK, Good,
Excellent, Best Imaginable. Of the participants who rated a system OK, the average SUS score was
52.0 and of those who selected Good, the average SUS score was 72.8. In a study on well known user
interfaces, Excel received an average SUS score of 56.5, people gave their GPS’s an average rating
of 70.8, while the iPhone received a 78.5 average[43]. In light of these results and the complexity of
PSI, we find our scores on the System Usability Scale encouraging.
Incorporating Feedback After each phase of testing, modifications were made to the design
of the tool and the documentation in accordance with user performance and feedback. A major
change inspired by the usability test was the incorporation of a tutorial mode that is automatically
triggered when users first encounter the interface. The tutorial orients users to the features of the
tool and guides them through selecting their first statistic. There were also substantial changes
made to the documentation with a focus on simpler, more concise language and more intuitive and
visual locations of help text throughout the interface. Many more smaller changes were made to
improve the usability of the UI, including new buttons, bug fixes, hiding advanced features when
they’re not needed, and a host of cosmetic adjustments. As mentioned in the results section, a
particular effort was made after each testing phase to prevent accidental privacy leaks. The most
significant of these was a more rigorous automatic checking system during privacy loss parameter
selection. These checks work to prevent accidental unsafe parameter settings and provide clear alert
messages if imprudent choices are made.
15 Empirical Evaluation
In addition to user testing, we have experimentally evaluated all of the differentially private algo-
rithms implemented in PSI using a combination of real and synthetic data.
We have performed two main kinds of experimental evaluations: experiments aiming at confirm-
ing the feasibility of releasing several statistics with a given budget, experiments replicating studies
from the social science literature.
Experiments on the combined release of statistics The goal of this category of experiment
was to answer the question “can we release basic statistics for all the variables with a fixed budget
and with a good accuracy?”
We have analyzed several datasets of different size (with n as small as 103 and as big as 106)
available in Dataverse. The overall goal was to release all the univariate statistics currently imple-
mented in PSI under different values of the budget for  (in the range [0.01, 1]) with fixed δ (set at
2−20) and varying the secrecy of the sample assumption (with values 1%, 3%, 5%, 100%). We have
considered different splits of the privacy loss parameters among the different statistics, and we have
experimented using the optimal composition theorem and the basic composition theorem. We have
also used different accuracy measures to capture different characteristics of the different data: mean
absolute error, mean relative error, mean squared error, root of mean squared error, `1, `2 and `∞
norm.
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From this experience we learned that in many situations we can provide differentially private
results for all the univariate statistics with a non-trivial accuracy. For datasets with sample size
100,000 we were able to release several univariate statistics (mean, histograms, and CDF) for all the
variables (∼50 attributes), with mean absolute error ≤ 10%, with global  = 0.3 and global delta
2−20, as shown in Figure 7.
As expected, these results have shown some variability depending on the setup of the parameters,
e.g. larger dataset sizes and larger values of epsilon give better accuracy, as well as on the error
metric used to measure accuracy. Nevertheless, the experiments we performed met some of the
expectations set in Section 6 and confirmed what the theoretical analysis tell us. Besides, this step
helped us optimizing the code of the different statistics increasing the scalability of the analysis, e.g.
the release of several univariate statistics (mean, histograms, and CDF) on datasets with milions of
entries and ∼50 variables takes less than 10sec.
Figure 7: Normalized mean absolute error for Means, Histograms, and CDFs for (5,10,20, and 50)
variables from the PUMS dataset.
Replication of social science studies Replicating the results of published works is a higher bar
for PSI than the actual initial goal, which is to support data exploration (for determining whether
one should apply for access to raw data). Nevertheless, we created a corpus of 80 datasets from
quantitative social science by finding datasets on repositories and reaching out to authors of studies.
Our goal was to find datasets that could be publicly released, but whose topics and structure closely
resembled those that would ordinarily be closed due to the inclusion of sensitive data. These give us a
variety of types and sizes of datasets from which we can benchmark the performance of differentially
private statistics, while releasing in comparison the true dataset values. From this corpus, we also
chose twelve studies which had published articles or reports using simple statistical methods that
we could emulate using our available differentially private statistics. These ranged in size from 926
observations in a survey of high school biology teachers and whether they teach evolution in the
classroom to 369,000 observations in a randomized field experiment testing the ability to mobilize
voters by pride or shame by mailing them their previous turnout history. As an exemplar, we briefly
describe one replication study.
The Pew Research Center conducts periodic public opinion polling of attitudes and social and
demographic factors. They released a report describing trends over time in their data with regard
to attitudes toward same-sex marriage [47, 62], first of which was that “Public support for same-sex
marriage has grown rapidly over the past decade”. The report looked at 34 separate nationally
representative surveys conducted from 2004 to 2017 which each asked respondents whether they
favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry (or don’t know). We replicate this study by
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Figure 8: Pew opinion data over time, and estimated trends.
using differential privacy to release the mean favor and oppose rates for each survey. The true
and DP survey means are shown in Figure 8 in blue and red respectively. We used a conservative
=0.01 for each survey mean; while the mean and median sample sizes across surveys are slightly
over 2000 respondents, the range in sample size is relatively large, giving different degrees of noise
across released means. Although each of the released means are noisy, the expected error is zero,
and the trend remains. As shown clearly in the figure, the trend from the best fit line across the
DP releases is very close to the trend line from using the raw data, and an analyst exploring this
data with PSI could have discovered the same finding with a high level of privacy protection.
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